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SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This appeal requires us to further define the contours 
of the legislative immunity provided to Virgin Islands 
legislators under 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d). Under that federal 
statute, legislators are protected from being “held to answer 
before any tribunal other than the legislature for any speech 
or debate in the legislature.”  48 U.S.C. § 1572(d). In light of 
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the rich tradition of protecting free and open legislative 
debate—a tradition with historical roots reaching back to 
monarchical disputes with the British Parliament—courts 
must be vigilant to apply the protections of § 1572(d) to their 
fullest extent.  
Yet despite the importance of legislative immunity, § 
1572(d) offers only a limited exception to the general rule 
that the law applies equally to both those who make the law 
and those who are empowered to elect their lawmakers. In 
this appeal, a former Virgin Islands senator accused of 
violating two criminal statutes argues that § 1572(d) shields 
him from prosecution. Because we conclude that the conduct 
underlying the Government’s allegations in this case is 
clearly not legislative conduct protected by § 1572(d), we 
hold that the former senator may stand trial. The District 
Court’s denial of the former senator’s motion to dismiss or 
suppress will therefore be affirmed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3241. We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory 
appeal under the collateral order doctrine.  United States v. 
Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. 
McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 288 (3d Cir. 1994). We review the 
District Court’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual 




In October of 2015, a grand jury returned a three-count 
indictment charging former Virgin Islands Senator Wayne 
James with two counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343,1 
and one count of federal programs embezzlement under 
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).2 These charges stemmed from 
                                                 
1 18 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in part: 
 
“Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, transmits or 
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, 
radio, or television communication in 
interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds 
for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” 
 
2 18 U.S.C. § 666 provides in part: 
 
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described 
in subsection (b) of this section exists-- 
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a 
State, local, or Indian tribal government, or 
any agency thereof-- 
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James’ use of legislative funds to ostensibly obtain historical 
documents from Denmark related to the Fireburn—an 1878 
uprising in St. Croix,3 which at the time was part of the 
                                                                                                             
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or 
otherwise without authority knowingly 
converts to the use of any person other than 
the rightful owner or intentionally 
misapplies, property that-- 
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and 
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, 
custody, or control of such organization, 
government, or agency. . . . 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both. 
(b) The circumstance referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section is that the 
organization, government, or agency 
receives, in any one year period, benefits in 
excess of $10,000 under a Federal program 
involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, 
guarantee, insurance, or other form of 
Federal assistance.  18 U.S.C. § 666. 
 
3 Although slavery had been abolished in the Danish 
West Indies in 1848, strict labor laws meant that former 
slaves continued to work under harsh conditions. These 
conditions led to the civil unrest that ultimately 
culminated with the 1878 Fireburn. During the Fireburn, 
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Danish West Indies. Although James argues that he was 
engaged in legislative fact-finding when he used Legislature 
funds to secure Fireburn documents, the alleged conduct 
underlying the indictment is distinct from any legislative 
activity James might have participated in. Specifically, the 
indictment charges that James misused funds in four respects, 
by: (1) obtaining cash advances from the Legislature but 
retaining a portion of those funds for his personal use; (2) 
double-billing for expenses for which he had already received 
a cash advance; (3) submitting invoices and receiving funds 
for translation work that was never actually done; and (4) 
submitting invoices and receiving funds for translation work 
that was completed before his election to the Legislature.  JA 
34–35. 
In February of 2017, James filed a motion to dismiss 
the indictment on legislative immunity grounds, or, in the 
alternative, to suppress evidence.  JA 40. The District Court 
heard oral arguments on the motion, and ultimately denied 
James’ motion without prejudice in order to allow James to 
supplement the record with additional documents. James 
supplemented the record and participated in an additional 
hearing before the District Court, but nonetheless failed to 
                                                                                                             
three female leaders led a labor revolt that resulted in the 
burning of sugar fields and plantations throughout the 
town of Frederiksted in St. Croix.  See Martin Selsoe 
Sorensen, Denmark Gets First Public Statue of a Black 





persuade the District Court to grant his motion. James then 
sought interlocutory appeal, and in April of 2017 this Court 
dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  United 
States v. James, 686 F. App’x. 128, 129 (3d Cir. 2017). We 
did so because the District Court’s oral order was not a 
“definitive decision . . . on the speech-or-debate issue.”  Id. 
We therefore “encourage[d] the District Court to enter a final 
decision and order on the defendant’s motion, taking into 
account the supplemental materials and making whatever 
formal findings of fact that are necessary.”  Id. 
On remand in July of 2017, the District Court issued 
an oral order denying James’ motion.  James Supp. App. 79, 
81 (“The Court is certainly appreciative of the defense’s 
position, but is not persuaded by it. . . . [T]he Court doesn’t 
find that [James’ actions] are even close to legislative acts. . . 
. [T]he Court is hard-pressed to find anything that comes 
close to an allegation that would implicate legislative 
activity.”). In October of 2017, the District Court issued a 
written memorandum outlining the rationale behind its oral 
decision to deny James’ motion.  Case 3:15-cr-000042-CVG-
RM, ECF No. 164. In the memorandum, the District Court 
explained that James’ actions were ultimately not legislative 
acts worthy of statutory protection under the Organic Act of 
the Virgin Islands. This appeal followed. 
IV. JAMES’ ALLEGED ACTIONS ARE NOT PROTECTED 
The Organic Act of the Virgin Islands functions as a 
constitution for the Virgin Islands, and vests “[t]he legislative 
power and authority of the Virgin Islands” in a legislature 
“consisting of one house.”  48 U.S.C. § 1571(a). Members of 
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the legislature are “known as senators.”  48 U.S.C. § 1571(b). 
In order to provide these senators with a form of legislative 
immunity, the Organic Act of the Virgin Islands contains 
language similar to the Speech or Debate Clause contained 
within Article I § 6 of the United States Constitution.4 
Specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d) provides the following 
protection to senators of the Virgin Islands: 
No member of the legislature shall be held to 
answer before any tribunal other than the 
legislature for any speech or debate in the 
legislature and the members shall in all cases, 
except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, 
be privileged from arrest during their attendance 
at the sessions of the legislature and in going to 
and returning from the same. 
48 U.S.C. § 1572(d). Since James is asserting this legislative 
privilege, “the burden of establishing the applicability of 
legislative immunity, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
rests with him.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 
524 (3d Cir. 1985). A court must dismiss an indictment if the 
indictment relies on protected legislative acts, see id. at 525, 
                                                 
4 U.S. CONST. ART. I § 6 (“The Senators and 
Representatives shall . . . in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from 
Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their 
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the 
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
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or if there was a “wholesale violation of the speech or debate 
clause before a grand jury” such that the privileged material 
“cannot be excised.”  United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 
200, 205 (3d Cir. 1980). As explained below, neither the 
indictment nor grand jury proceedings violate 48 U.S.C. § 
1572(d).  
A. The Indictment 
This Court has previously stated that “the 
interpretation given to the Speech or Debate Clause of the 
Federal Constitution, while not dispositive as to the meaning 
of the legislative immunity provision for the Virgin Islands, 
is, nevertheless, highly instructive.”  Lee, 775 F.2d at 520. 
One helpful case interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Federal Constitution is Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 
606 (1972). There, the Supreme Court declared that the clause 
protects “speech or debate in either House,” as well as “other 
matters” that are “an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation 
or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places 
within the jurisdiction of either House.”  Id. at 625 (emphasis 
added). 
 To assist in determining what types of actions are “an 
integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes,” the Third Circuit has established a “two-step 
framework for identifying legislative acts protected by the 
Speech or Debate Clause.”  Menendez, 831 F.3d at 166. The 
first step is to “look to the form of the act to determine 
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whether it is inherently legislative or non-legislative.”  Id. If 
“an act is neither manifestly legislative nor clearly non-
legislative, then it is ambiguously legislative,” and a court 
must accordingly proceed to the second Menendez step. Id. 
This second step requires a court to “consider the content, 
purpose, and motive of the act to assess its legislative or non-
legislative character.”  Id. 
 Applying the first Menendez step to the case at hand, 
we conclude that the conduct for which James has been 
criminally charged is inherently non-legislative. This is not a 
close call. In providing examples of inherently non-legislative 
actions,5 Menendez explicitly mentioned “illegitimate 
activities such as accepting bribes in exchange for taking 
official action.” Id. We have noted that “[e]ven if these non-
legislative acts involve policy or relate to protected legislative 
activity, they are not protected.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972) (“Taking a bribe is, 
                                                 
5 United States v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“On the other side of the spectrum, some acts are 
so clearly non-legislative that no inquiry into their 
content or underlying motivation or purpose is needed to 
classify them. Examples include legitimate constituent 
services such as “the making of appointments with 
Government agencies, assistance in securing Government 
contracts, preparing so-called ‘news letters’ to 
constituents, news releases, and speeches delivered 
outside the Congress,” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512, and, of 
course, illegitimate activities such as accepting bribes in 
exchange for taking official action, id. at 526.”). 
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obviously, no part of the legislative process or function; it is 
not a legislative act.”). 
The conversion of legislative funds to personal use is 
similar to collecting bribes. James’ alleged conversion of 
those funds falls squarely within the category of 
“illegitimate,” and such actions are inherently non-legislative. 
The actions complained of in the indictment are not James’ 
informal fact-finding actions, but are instead illicit activities 
that are at most tangential to such informal fact-finding. 
Specifically, the indictment alleges that James (1) retained 
portions of legislative funds for his own personal use; (2) 
double-billed for expenses; (3) submitted invoices and 
received funds for translation work that was never actually 
done; and (4) submitted invoices and received funds for 
translation work that was completed prior to his election.  JA 
34–35. We hold that these actions are the types of 
“illegitimate activities” comparable to “accepting bribes” that 
Menendez referred to as inherently non-legislative and 
therefore unprotected.  
Although these actions might be tangentially related to 
the types of informal fact-finding actions in which James 
participated, the indictment is not concerned with any actual 
fact-finding efforts that James performed. Rather, the 
indictment focuses on James’ use of legislative funds in ways 
that diverged from any legitimate legislative goal.  See Gov’t 
Br. 52 (noting that “the Government has never offered” bills 
and committee hearings referred to by James into evidence, 
nor do they “appear [any]where in the indictment,” and 
further stating that “there are no ‘Fireburn documents’ at the 
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heart of the Government’s case. It is the absence of any such 
documents that forms the basis of the indictment.”).  
In concluding that James’ alleged actions are 
inherently non-legislative, we are guided by the Supreme 
Court case of United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
In that case, a former United States Senator was indicted for 
accepting a bribe.  Id. at 502. In holding that the Federal 
Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause did not prohibit the 
federal bribery charges at issue in that case, the Supreme 
Court drew a distinction between (a) the former Senator’s 
acceptance of the bribe (i.e., the illegal conduct) and (b) the 
performance of the illegally promised conduct (i.e., the 
legislative act).  As the Court explained: 
The question is whether it is necessary to 
inquire into how appellee spoke, how he 
debated, how he voted, or anything he did in the 
chamber or in committee in order to make out a 
violation of this statute. The illegal conduct is 
taking or agreeing to take money for a promise 
to act in a certain way. There is no need for the 
Government to show that appellee fulfilled the 
alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe 
is the violation of the statute, not performance 
of the illegal promise.   
Id. at 526.  
James’ alleged conduct can be similarly distinguished 
from any types of legislative acts that might be protected 
under 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d). Although we reaffirm this Court’s 
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previous conclusion that “as a general matter, legislative fact-
finding is entitled to the protection of legislative immunity,”6 
                                                 
6 Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 517 (3d 
Cir. 1985). The Lee Court made clear that “fact-finding 
occupies a position of sufficient importance in the 
legislative process to justify the protection afforded by 
legislative immunity.”  Id. at 521. Moreover, Lee can 
fairly be read to not only encompass “formal” fact-
finding efforts—such as legislative hearings or 
subpoenas—but also so-called “informal” fact-finding 
efforts. The facts in Lee itself involved an informal trip to 
New York and Washington that was purportedly 
legislative in nature, and the Lee Court cited favorably to 
precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, which stated that “[t]he 
acquisition of knowledge through informal sources is a 
necessary concomitant of legislative conduct and thus 
should be within the ambit of the privilege so that 
congressmen are able to discharge their constitutional 
duties properly.”  Lee, 775 F.2d at 521 (quoting 
McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1286–87 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added). We also note that James 
has additionally directed our attention to persuasive 
precedent supporting the proposition that legislative 
immunity extends to “informal” fact-finding.  Jewish 
War Veterans of the U.S., Inc. v. Gates, 506 F. Supp. 2d 
30, 54 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The Members are correct that, 
under the law of this and other circuits, informal 
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the various ways that James is alleged to have converted 
Legislature funds to his own personal use can be separated 
from any informal fact-finding that might have otherwise 
served a legitimate legislative purpose. As the District Court 
ultimately concluded in its memorandum, “[t]he prosecutors 
may simply demonstrate that payments were made to James 
that were unwarranted and illegal. Thus, any evidence 
regarding the Fireburn legislation can be excised from the 
prosecution.” Case 3:15-cr-000042-CVG-RM, ECF No. 164, 
at 28. We agree with the District Court.  A careful 
examination of the specific conduct underlying the indictment 
in this case (i.e., illegal conversion of legislative funds) 
reveals that, as in Brewster, a conviction could be sustained 
without “inquir[ing] into the [legislative] act or its 
motivation.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 527; see also United 
States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) (“All 
that is required is that in presenting material to the grand jury 
the prosecutor uphold the Constitution and refrain from 
introducing evidence of past legislative acts or the motivation 
for performing them.”); United States. v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 
511, 517 (3d Cir. 1978) (“We think Brewster compels the 
                                                                                                             
information gathering in connection with or in aid of a 
legitimate legislative act is itself protected by the Speech 
or Debate Clause.”). But although James’ purchasing of 
Fireburn documents could qualify as informal fact-
finding, the indictment is not concerned with such 
conduct. Rather, the indictment charges James with 
participating in inherently non-legislative acts of 




conclusion that the indictment in the case before us does not 
violate the Speech or Debate Clause. . . . [T]o establish a 
prima facie case, the government need not show any of the 
legislative acts for which the defendant allegedly accepted 
payments.”). 
 Even if we were to conflate James’ allegedly illegal 
actions with his informal fact-finding—such that we 
understood his actions to be “ambiguously legislative”—the 
second step in Menendez requires us to “consider the content, 
purpose, and motive of the act to assess its legislative or non-
legislative character.” Menendez, 831 F.3d at 166. James 
takes issue with such a “second-guessing” of his motives.  
James Br. 32 (“[T]he government’s allegations rest entirely 
on a forbidden evaluation of a legislator’s motives for 
performing the manifestly legislative act of fact-finding.  
Where, as here, a case rests on legislative actions, no further 
inquiry is permitted into a legislator’s alleged motives for 
those actions.”). Clear precedent from this Court, however, 
requires us to look beyond James’ own characterization of his 
conduct.  
In Lee, we made clear that legislative immunity “does 
not bar an inquiry into whether a legislator’s activities and 
conversations were, in fact, legislative in nature.”  Lee, 775 
F.2d at 517. We explained that “[a]lthough Lee maintains that 
his meetings and conversations were official in nature, and 
did involve information gathering, such assertions cannot 
preclude a court of competent jurisdiction from determining 
whether Lee’s conversations were, in fact, legislative in 
nature so as to trigger the immunity.”  Id. at 522. Our 
“dispositive holding” in Lee was therefore “that it is proper to 
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look into a purported legislative act of fact-finding in order to 
determine if it is, indeed, a legislative act which is privileged, 
or whether it is an act which falls outside any legislative 
immunity.”  Id. at 526.  
Examining James’ motives reveals that even in 
instances where he allegedly used legislative funds to pay for 
Fireburn materials, James appears to have done so because of 
personal interests that were unrelated to his job as a legislator. 
In some instances, for example, James allegedly obtained 
legislative funds to pay for translation work that he had 
requested in 2006—before he had even been elected to the 
legislature.7  Gov’t Br. 7 (“Despite owing money to Kalhoj 
for over two years before becoming a senator, [James] 
submitted an invoice to the Legislature in 2009 to get the 
money to pay his debt. . . . [James emailed Kalhoj stating] 
that ‘I don’t recall when the work was commissioned, so 
please just put today’s date on both invoices.’”) (citing Gov’t 
Supp. App. 24)). In other instances, James is alleged to have 
sought Fireburn documents in order to write a personal 
screenplay about a historical love affair. Gov’t Supp. App. 28 
(“It was this reference in this book that led me to do the 
research. I think it will make a great movie. I will do a 
screenplay when I get the 130 pages of translated documents 
from the Danish Archives.”); Gov’t Supp. App. 31 (“As I 
indicated, I am going to Cannes in May (as the guest of the 
mayor of the town). I will write up a screenplay and shop it 
around while at the Film Festival.”). Therefore, even if we 
                                                 
7 James was elected to the legislature in 2008, and served 
from 2009 to 2011.  
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were to conflate James’ alleged illegal actions (e.g., double 
billing, etc.) with acts that he argues were legislative in nature 
(i.e., researching Fireburn documents for future legislation) 
such that we found James’ actions to be “ambiguously 
legislative,” examining James’ motives under Menendez’s 
second step reveals that those actions were personal—rather 
than legislative—in nature. Such personal actions are not 
protected under 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d).  See Brewster, 408 U.S. 
at 516 (“Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be 
read broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the 
independence of the Legislative Branch, but no more than the 
statutes we apply, was its purpose to make Members of 
Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal 
responsibility.”). 
To conclude, nothing in the indictment requires the 
Government to prove any legislative acts at trial. To the 
contrary, the indictment relies upon how James’ alleged 
conduct diverged from what he purported to be doing 
officially.  See, e.g., JA 34 (referring to the wire fraud charges 
of Counts I and II and stating that “[t]he purpose of the 
scheme to defraud was to enrich the defendant, WAYNE 
A.G. JAMES, by appropriating Legislature funds for 
JAMES’[] own personal use and benefit”); JA 36 (Referring 
to the federal program embezzlement charge in Count III and 
stating that “JAMES obtained . . . Government of the Virgin 
Islands funds based on false representations that the money be 
used to fund historical research, when in fact JAMES 
appropriated a portion of the money to his own use”). 
Because the indictment does not rely upon protected 
legislative acts, it does not violate the protections offered to 
legislators under 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d).   
 19 
 
B. The Grand Jury Proceedings 
As explained in Part IV.A. above, the indictment does 
not depend on the Government establishing that James 
completed particular legislative acts—it merely requires 
showing that James illegally converted legislative funds to his 
own personal use. But a legal indictment does not end our 
analysis. As we wrote in Menendez, the Speech or Debate 
Clause “create[s] a privilege against the use of ‘evidence of a 
legislative act’ in a prosecution or before a grand jury.”  
Menendez, 831 F.3d at 165 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 
487 (1979)). The grand jury proceedings in this case included 
questioning that, arguably, was impermissibly related to 
legislative acts. Specifically, James complains of the 
questioning of his “top legislative aid”8 and references to 
                                                 
8 At least in some instances, legislative immunity extends 
to legislative aids acting on behalf of a legislator.  See 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1972) 
(“We agree with the Court of Appeals that for the 
purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his 
aide are to be ‘treated as one,’ United States v. Doe, 455 
F.2d[ 753,] 761 [(1st Cir. 1972)]. . . . [I]t is literally 
impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern 
legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in 
session and matters of legislative concern constantly 
proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their 
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; 
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the 
Members’ performance that they must be treated as the 
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“communications between Mr. James and at least one other 
legislator describing his research and its role in crafting 
legislation Mr. James later introduced.”  James Br. 36. 
Assuming, arguendo, that James’ characterization of 
the grand jury proceedings is accurate,9 the isolated instances 
he identifies do not rise to the level of a “wholesale violation 
of the speech or debate clause before a grand jury” that this 
Court has previously held to necessitate the dismissal of an 
indictment. United States v. Helstoski, 635 F.2d 200, 205 (3d 
Cir. 1980). In Helstoski, we wrote that “[i]t can be argued that 
implicit in the [Supreme] Court’s holdings that the [Brewster 
                                                                                                             
latter’s alter egos; and that if they are not so recognized, 
the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause—to 
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and 
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary—will 
inevitably be diminished and frustrated.”) (internal 
citations removed).  
9 James provides no record citation when he complains of 
the “communications between Mr. James and at least one 
other legislator describing his research and its role in 
crafting legislation Mr. James later introduced.”  See 
James Br. 36. Our independent review of the record, 
including the email between James and then-Senate 
President Louis Hill, JA 74, reveals no violations of the 
Speech or Debate Clause that even come close to the 
violations identified in Helstoski.  See United States v. 




and Johnson]10 cases could be tried without reference to 
protected matters was the conclusion that the grand juries’ 
considerations of the privileged material were not fatal to the 
indictments.”  Id. Aligning with Helstoski, at least two of our 
sister circuits have similarly concluded that minor references 
to legislative acts during the grand jury process do not require 
the dismissal of an otherwise valid indictment.  See United 
States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Still, 
the mere fact that some ‘legislative act’ evidence was 
                                                 
10 In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 503 (1972), 
a former United States Senator was indicted for accepting 
a bribe. In Brewster, the Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of the indictment then at hand, 
even though “the indictment charge[d] the offense as 
being in part linked to Brewster’s action, vote and 
decision on postage rate legislation,” in part because the 
government did not need to “prove any specific act, 
speech, debate, or decision to establish a violation of the 
statute under which appellee was indicted.”  Id. at 527–
28 (quotation marks omitted). 
In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), 
the Supreme Court considered the prosecution of a 
former Congressman for violation of the federal conflict 
of interest statute and for conspiracy to defraud the 
United States. In Johnson, the Court held that the 
government was not precluded from bringing a new trial 
under the condition that the government remove all 
references to the Congressman’s speech that were 
“offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause.”  Id. at 185. 
 22 
 
presented to the grand jury cannot entitle Renzi to dismissal. 
That would contravene the [Supreme] Court’s example in 
Brewster and Johnson—two cases in which the Court decided 
that dismissal of the indictment was not warranted even 
though each Member was indicted by grand juries to whom 
the Government had presented ‘legislative act’ evidence.”); 
United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 (11th Cir. 
1992) (“A member’s Speech or Debate privilege is violated if 
the Speech or Debate material exposes the member to 
liability, but a member is not necessarily exposed to liability 
just because the grand jury considers improper Speech or 
Debate material. . . . If reference to a legislative act is 
irrelevant to the decision to indict, the improper reference has 
not subjected the member to criminal liability. The case can 
proceed to trial with the improper references expunged.”). 
In Helstoski¸ we referred to the district court’s finding 
“that evidence violating the speech or debate clause was so 
extensive that it completely infected those proceedings.”  
Helstoski, 635 F.2d at 202. Specifically, evidence used by the 
government in that case “included testimony concerning 
Helstoski’s motivations for the introduction of private 
immigration bills, the procedures by which such bills were 
presented in the House of Representatives, his office 
procedures for handling such requests, as well as 
correspondence and files concerning these bills and copies of 
the bills themselves.” Id.  
Unlike in Helstoski¸ where the violations of the Speech 
or Debate Clause could not be “excised,” id. at 205, the case 
at hand can be tried without reference to any legislative acts.  
See also Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512 (“[A] Member of 
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Congress may be prosecuted under a criminal statute 
provided that the [g]overnment’s case does not rely on 
legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts.”). To 
repeat, the Government’s allegations underlying the case at 
hand do not rely on establishing that James performed any 
legislative acts. Rather, the Government’s case relies on 
establishing that James’ actions diverged from any genuine 
legislative act that James may wish to argue he engaged in. In 
light of that distinction, we agree with the District Court that 
“any evidence regarding the Fireburn legislation can be 
excised from the prosecution.”  Case 3:15-cr-000042-CVG-
RM, ECF No. 164, at 28. Moreover, the District Court has 
correctly identified its trial duty to “exercis[e] its gatekeeper 
function . . . [by] exclud[ing] and excis[ing] any proposed 
evidence that runs afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause.”  Id. 
at 28–29. We therefore hold that neither the indictment nor 
the grand jury proceedings ran afoul of 48 U.S.C. § 1572(d). 
The District Court’s denial of James’ motion will be 
affirmed.11 
                                                 
11 Because we conclude that the alleged conduct underlying 
the indictment and grand jury proceedings in the case at hand 
did not constitute legislative conduct protected by 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1572(d), we need not consider whether that federal statute 
protects Virgin Islands legislators from federal prosecutions 
in addition to prosecutions brought by co-equal components 





 We hold that James’ conduct as alleged in the 
indictment is inherently non-legislative in nature. Neither the 
indictment nor the grand jury proceedings violated the 
protections afforded to Virgin Islands legislators by 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1572(d). We therefore will affirm the District Court.  
